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Reno v. Koray:
TIME CONFINED IN
A TREATMENT
CENTER AS A
CONDITION OF
RELEASE ON BAIL
DOES NOT QUALIFY
FOR CREDIT
AGAINST TIME
SERVED UNDER

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
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Section 3585(b) of Title 18 ofthe United States Code
provides that sentence credit
should be given for time served
in official detention prior to sentencing. In Reno v. Koray, 115
S. Ct. 2021 (1995), the United
States Supreme Court determined that credit for time served
shall not extend to time detained
at a treatment center while released on bail prior to sentencing.
After pleading guilty to
laundering money, Ziya Koray
("Koray") was ordered released
on bail pending sentencing. As
a condition of release, the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland required
that Koray be confined to a community treatment center until
sentencing. Koray was not allowed to leave the treatment
center for any reason unless
accompanied by a Government
special agent. Koray remained
confined to the treatment center
for approximately 150 days,
after which time he was sentenced to forty-one months at
Allenwood Federal Prison in
Pennsylvania.
The Bureau of Prisons
("BOP") denied Koray's request for credit toward his sentence for the time spent at the
treatment center. A petition to
the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for credit was also denied. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, however, determined that official detention
under section 3585(b) should
include jail-type confinement.
The court reversed and remand-

ed for a determination ofwhether Koray's confinement at the
treatment center was, in fact,
jail-type.
The Government's petition for certiorari was granted
by the United States Supreme
Court to determine whether time
confined to a treatment center
while released on bail qualifies
as "official detention" under
section 3585(b); thus, entitling
a defendant to sentence credit
for time confined. The Court
held that it does not.
In reaching its decision,
the Court conducted a four-part
analysis of section 3585(b): (1)
the plain meaning of the statute; (2) the statute in conjunction with the Bail Reform Act
of 1984; (3) the context and
history of the statute in conjunction with related sentencing provisions; and (4) the statute as defined by BOP internal
guidelines.
Koray argued that a
plain meaning interpretation of
official detention should be applied. Koray, 115 S. Ct. at
2027. A plain meaning interpretation would include both
detained confinement and situations where equally restrictive
conditions are placed on released confinement. Id. Although Koray was released on
bail, his detainment at the treatment center was subject to restraints which were significantly similar to those imposed on a
detained defendant assigned to
a treatment center as part of his
sentence. Koray was subject to
random breath and urine tests,
his access to visitors was limit-

RECENTDEVEL OPMENTS
ed, he had to account for his
presence five times a day, and
he was not allowed to leave the
treatment center unless accompanied by a Special Agent.
The Court acknowledged that Koray's plain meaning definition of official detention is plausible when viewed
in isolation. However, a "'fundamental principle of statutory
construction . . . [is] that the
meaning of a word cannot be
determined in isolation, but
must be drawn from the context
in which it is used."' Id. at 2025
(quoting Dealv. UnitedStates,
113 S. Ct. 1993, 1996 (1993)).
Therefore, section 358 5(b) must
be interpreted in conjunction
with the Bail Reform Act of
1984, enacted in the same statute as the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 (of which section
3585 is a part), and which authorizes federal courts to restrain the liberty of a defendant.
Id.
The Court noted that the
Bail Reform Act provided a
court with two options for treatment of defendants awaiting
sentencing--release on bail or
detainment without bail. A
court releasing a defendant on
bail may impose a variety of
restrictive conditions on a defendant's release, including residence in a community treatment center. Id. A court detaining a defendant issues a detention order which commits the
defendant to the custody of the
Attorney General for confinement in a correctional facility.
1d.
Based on this analysis,

the Court determined that a defendant is considered detained
only when committed to the
custody of the Attorney General, and a defendant given bail
with restrictive conditions, like
Koray, is considered released.
Id Emphasis is thereby placed
on the identity of the defendant's custodian. Thus, Koray
was not officially detained within the meaning of the Bail Reform Act because he was not in
the custody of and subject to the
BOP's control. Id. at 2028.
The Court next sought
to interpret section 3585(b) in
conjunction with the history and
'context of this section and related sentencing statutes. Id.at
2026. In 1984, section 3585(b)
replaced section 3568. Section
3585(b) replaced section 3568's
term "in custody" withthe term
"official detention." Id.Historically, section 3568 was interpreted uniformly to preclude
sentence credit for restrictions
placed on a defendant's liberty
as a condition of release on bail.
Id. Therefore, the Court interpreted Congress' intent in
amending the language of section 3585(b) as merely an attempt to conform its language
to that of related sentencing statutes and the Bail Reform Act.
Id.
Section 3585(a) dictates
that a sentence begin when the
defendant arrives at an official
detention facility. Comparing
the language of related sentencing statutes, the Court noted
that section 3621 of Title 18
submits a sentenced defendant
to the custody of the BOP, and

vests in the BOP the authority
to designate which penal or correctional facility a defendant
will reside in. Id. at 2025-26.
Further, section 3622 of Title
18 grants the BOP authority to
allow a prisoner to be released
to participate in an educational
program while in official detention, and to allow work release of a prisoner while in
official detention. Id. at 2026.
Based on this analysis,
the Court determined that an
official detention facility is a
correctional facility designated
by the BOP (as provided for in
section 3621), and that official
detention should have the same
meaning in section 3585(b) as
in related sentencing statutes.
Id Thus, Koray was not officially detained, as defined by
the history and context of section 3585(b) when compared to
related sentencing statutes.
Finally, the Court found
persuasive a Bureau of Prisons
Program Statement which
clearly interpreted the meaning
and intent of section 3585(b).
The Statement asserted that
"' [t]ime spent in residence in a
community corrections center.
. as a result of a condition of
bail or bond. . . is not creditable
as pre-sentence time. "' Id. at
2027 n.4 (quoting U. S.Dept. of
Justice, Bureau of Prisons Program StatementNo. 5880.28(c)
(July 19, 1994)) (emphasis added). The Statement also asserted that highly restrictive confinement as a condition of bail
is not considered time served in
official detention. Id Thus,
Koray was not officially de-
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tained, as defined by BOP internal guidelines.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg pointed
out an interesting ramification
of this statutory interpretation.
A due process defense may
emerge for a defendant who did
not elect bail with the understanding that time released to a
treatment center, as opposed to
detained to a treatment center
orjail, would preclude sentence
credit. Strategically, criminal
defendants may be wise to

request that the court deny bail
and hold them in custody if
their release on bail would be
subject to restraints (i.e., confinement to a treatment center)
which do not materially differ
from those imposed on a detained defendant.
In Reno v. Koray, the
Court recognized that restraints
imposed on a released defendant may not materially differ
from those imposed on a detained defendant. However,
adopting the Third Circuit's test

of jail-type confinement would
place an onerous burden on the
fact-finder and, more importantly, create a potential for disparity in treatment of defendants.
Determination of whether a
defendant will receive credit for
time served must, therefore, turn
on whether the defendant
enjoyed a released or detained
status.
-Cynthia L. Maskol
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